

Mr. HARTKE. The Senator well knows that we have been trying it and we are in the process of trying it now.

Mr. SMATHERS. The final decisions cannot be made by those actually involved, until Congress finally implements them. The big decisions cannot be made until then. The Senator knows that I do not wish him to drag me out on my own time, when the Senator has a monumental speech of good quality to make. There is no doubt in the world about that. At this time, having said what I wish to say, I would now like to yield the floor.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, early today, a news release was read to the Senate about the prices of Ford automobiles in Canada.

I have undertaken to find out the suggested retail prices in both Detroit and Windsor. I find that the Ford Motor Co.'s suggested retail price in Detroit of a Mustang, two-door hard top, is \$2,416.18. The suggested retail price in Windsor, Canada, is \$3,099.

This is a difference of \$682.72 across the river.

Under this agreement, which Canada has already put into effect, all the tariffs are waived.

Who receives the \$682.72? The Ford Motor Co.

Who pays for it? The consumers of Canada.

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the will of the Senate?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, what is the argement on time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator that the Senate will vote at 4 o'clock on the pending motion by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE].

Mr. McCARTHY. I should like to take approximately 15 minutes on this subject, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be extended by 15 minutes.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, what was that request?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have the floor. I am going to speak approximately 15 minutes and I have requested that the time agreed to for debate on the pending motion be extended 15 minutes. I will limit my remarks to 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator that under the amended agreement, the time taken out for the immigration conference report was 15 minutes and therefore the time, if needed, is automatically extended 15 minutes.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time consumed by—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Indiana?

Mr. HARTKE. I ask unanimous consent that the time consumed by the remarks of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY] be not included in the time for this debate on this measure, and that the time for the vote be extended by that amount.

Mr. McCARTHY. That was my request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, on September 15, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], gave a speech on the floor of the Senate under the general title of "The Dominican Republic." In the days since September 15, the speech and the Senator from Arkansas have been both praised and blamed.

The speech involved more than the Dominican Republic. It raised basic questions about the overall policy toward Central and South America. His thoughtful remarks, which could have been the beginning in basis for a thorough discussion of Latin American policy, have achieved this objective only in a very limited way. In too great a measure, they have been made the basis for raising questions about the relative authenticity of various sources of information or about the right or the propriety of the chairman to speak as he did on this matter.

The distracting and confusing—and I say irrelevant—issue of who is pro-Communist and who is not pro-Communist has also been injected into the discussion.

It has been suggested that the Senator from Arkansas was favorable to the Communist revolution. This is most unfair. The record which he has made through the years both in speeches and in preparing legislation and in securing the passage of legislation dealing with international problems is the clear and continuous repudiation of this suggestion. To point out, as he did, that the alternative to political revolution and to social and economic reform is likely to be a communistic revolution, is certainly not to endorse or to indicate support of such a revolution.

The Senator from Arkansas, in his speech, in no way implied that he was presenting a committee position or that his statement was a substitute for a committee report.

As chairman of the committee, he noted and said many weeks before he gave this speech, that it would be impossible to secure an agreement on a report from committee members.

His conduct, during the hearings and after, has been wholly appropriate to a chairman of a committee as sensitive as is the Foreign Relations Committee. He held no public hearings. He did not give newspaper critics an opportunity to appear in public and present their views against the administration's policy. There has been no breach of any confidence on information given to the committee in confidence by the administration. He waited for a time to hold the hearings when there had been a degree of stability established in the Dominican

Republic, and made no speech on it until it was indicated that the administration was relatively satisfied with the kind of coalition government which had been established.

I share Senator FULBRIGHT's opinion that in the Dominican crisis there was hesitation in the early stages when action taken might have prevented bloodshed and resulted in at least as good a solution as was achieved much later.

The revolt began on Saturday, April 24. On April 25, the United States was asked to support the incumbent Reid Cabral government. In the hearings the administration witnesses did not, in my judgment, give a satisfactory answer to the question as to why there was no response to this request for support, especially since the testimony given indicated quite clearly that the U.S. Government did not seem particularly interested in whether the constitutionally scheduled elections for September of this year were to be held or not to be held—elections which might have changed the Government in the Dominican Republic.

On April 27, the rebel leaders, including Melina Urena and Caamano Deno, called upon the United States for mediation and negotiation. This request was turned down. It is my opinion that our failure to respond to either of these requests—first from the Reid government and second from the rebel group—was not primarily a consequence of the policy we were following, but rather a consequence of the lack of policy with regard to the Dominican Republic and of information. Certainly the American officials responsible for our relations with the Dominican Republic were unprepared. According to the Administration witnesses, certain members of the military mission were out of the country attending a conference on hemisphere defense in Panama City and one other member of the 13-man mission was out shooting with General Imbert. (According to Theodore Draper in the New Leader, 11 of the 13 members of the military mission were attending the conference in Panama City.) The Ambassador to the Dominican Republic was in the United States.

When the attempted coup was in its early stages, we evidently had no knowledge of its leaders, nor were we prepared to make a quick decision whether to support or reject it.

Senator FULBRIGHT said in his speech of September 15 that the degree of Communist influence in the Dominican revolt was "something on which reasonable men can differ." It is my opinion—and I share this opinion with the chairman of the committee—that there was very little Communist influence among those who first attempted the coup. As the revolt disintegrated and conditions became more chaotic, Communist influence in the revolt, which had less and less chance of success, did, I believe, increase in a relative measure.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the Record an editorial from the San Juan Star, entitled "The Dominican Reality," by A. W. Maldonado. I would like the

September 30, 1965

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

24709

RECORD to show that this is an English-language newspaper operated by the Cowles family, which also publishes the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, as well as other newspapers in the United States.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## THE DOMINICAN REALTY

(By A. W. Maldonado)

The Dominican Republic is going Communist. This is not my opinion nor the opinion of anyone in the country. This is the very simple reality.

Can the country be saved from becoming another Socialist republic under the influence, perhaps domination, of the Soviet Union or Communist China? The answer is that the country can be saved but it is unlikely. Everything seems to be contributing to a Communist tide and let's pinpoint what these factors are, one by one:

1. The great mass of Dominicans have seen their pitiful economic condition steadily deteriorate since the end of the Trujillo dictatorship in 1961. The capital, Santo Domingo, is teeming with thousands of unemployed youth who are being controlled, trained and fired up by Communist agitators. The great emotional charge among these youths is anti-Americanism and hatred for any Dominican with any material possession.

2. There is no structure or sense of law and order in the country today. The psychology of the Dominican masses is that everything belonged to Trujillo, Trujillo was a tyrant and a thief, thus everything in the country is fair game. At every point when civil order has been disrupted there has been massive looting and robbery. From the National Palace to small homes, mobs of desperate young men have looted whatever they can carry away.

3. There is no democratic moderate left in the country. Juan Bosch, the one man who gained popular support since 1962, remains in Puerto Rico although he can today return to the country. But even Bosch cannot hold back the Communist tide; he bitterly opposes and is opposed by anyone to his right and he would continue to get support from the Communists only as long as he tolerates them. Bosch, however, may well be one of the few men that can slow down the Communist tide; but the most he has said is that he is considering "in principle" to return on September 25.

4. The three Dominican Communist, pro-Castro and anti-American political movements, the Dominican Popular Movement, the Dominican Communist Party, and the June 14 Movement have captured the initiative throughout the country. They are the force behind the tremendous revolutionary mystique that now grips the vast majority of young Dominicans. They have so captured the psychological, propaganda war that even among visiting newsmen to be anti-Communist in the country today, is to be a rightist.

5. There is no effective, organized democratic middle class in the country. In almost every country needing economic-social reform as desperately as the Dominican Republic, it has been the democratic middle class that has combated communism. The Dominican middle class (which means the Dominican with a college education, a concrete home, and an automobile) is today considered the "extreme right, the betrayers of the fatherland." Having totally lost the propaganda, psychological war, the true Dominican democrats lack the power, the means, or the outside support to combat the Communist tide.

6. The Dominican military is disorganized, discredited, and leaderless. For three decades the Trujillo tool of suppression and

terror, the Dominican military is the perfect target and justification for the rebellion. World opinion, particularly in the United States, has sided with the rebels believing that only the total collapse of the old Trujillo military can make democracy possible in the country. But the odious reality is that the only force that can hold back the Communist tide is military power—today it is the U.S. Armed Forces under the OAS mantle.

7. The historical projection of the Dominican Republic is taking the country toward a convulsive, most probably violent revolution. Dominican history is one of foreign and local domination. It has never known any sustained period of democracy and freedom. Since the end of the Trujillo tyranny, the Dominicans have known nothing but frustration and broken promises. Without democratic institutions or traditions of any sort, the bitter conflict today is of the most basic sort—the haves nots against the haves.

Since the installation of the provisional government of Hector Garcia-Godoy, the threat of the Communist tide has become increasingly apparent. Although Garcia-Godoy is himself a moderate, he has been used by the extreme left to exploit the rebels' extraordinary psychological victory.

Just before I left the country, I was informed that there is some alarm in the Garcia-Godoy government and among U.S. diplomatic officials over the Communist tide. Efforts will be made, I was told, to reopen the two independent newspapers, El Caribe and El Listin Diario and to close down the effective, widely-read Communist propaganda sheet, Patria. Also, I was told that there will be several changes in the government to give the rebel side less voice and representation.

The opening of the country's independent press, I believe, is an important move; but it is not enough. The truth is that no one—not Garcia-Godoy nor the small army of U.S. officials today trying to help and steer his government—seem able to cope with the rising grassroots revolutionary fever. In the Dominican Republic, as in the rest of the world, no one has found the answer how to stop communism when all the conditions—hatred, injustices, fears, and exploitations—are present.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CARLSON. I want to associate myself with the remarks which have been made by the Senator from Minnesota with regard to the speech made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I cannot imagine anything more unfair than the suggestion that the chairman was soft on communism. I believe the committee chairman was entitled to credit for the way the hearing was arranged and conducted. In the first place, hearings were not held immediately. There was a wait until the situation had calmed down. Secondly, only administration witnesses were called. The only one who could not be called an administration witness was Governor Muñoz-Marin of Puerto Rico, and he was not unfriendly to the administration. The committee might have been accused of having called as witnesses against the administration policy the press correspondents who had written some very critical articles.

The Senator from Minnesota has rendered a real service in pointing out to the country the facts he has brought out today. I appreciate his comments.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from Kansas for joining me in these remarks.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I know the Senator from Minnesota has some further remarks to make, but since he has been interrupted, I should like to say that I appreciate very much what he has said with regard to the propriety of my speaking at all, and also upon the merits of the hearings. I should like to comment further after the Senator concludes his remarks.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from Arkansas did not need my defense. I know he can defend himself. But in the interest of committee procedures and also in the hope of moving this debate to a somewhat more constructive and substantive ground, I made the decision to speak on it.

Mr. President, in recent days there have begun to appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—as well as other publications, I assume—lists of Communists and alleged Communists in the Dominican Republic, as well as some declassified memorandum of Communist activities there. It has been the conclusion of some that this was additional information that was not available to the committee or to the chairman. This was not the case. I think it should be made clear that the critics of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] are not basing their criticism on more authoritative information than that which was available to the Foreign Relations Committee itself. These data, under confidential classification, were available to the committee as early as June along with other data.

In my judgment—and I think it is shared by the committee—the administration spokesmen and witnesses cooperated fully with the Foreign Relations Committee during the course of the committee's review of the Dominican Republic situation. Insofar as I know, every telegram—and every other document—the committee requested was made available.

It is always dangerous to publish a portion of a classified or confidential record, especially if what is published is in part declassified material. If a portion of the record is published, then it may be necessary to publish the entire record with the exception of those portions of it which may have bearing on national security. The testimony of all witnesses of course, was received in confidence by the committee, and these confidences must be respected unless the executive agencies agree to publication.

It is my opinion that, if need be, we ought to publish additional parts of the RECORD if Members feel they need additional information to make up their own minds.

If Members of the Senate are to disagree on a matter of this consequence, it must be on the basis of their interpretation of the whole record. A study of the record might also help Members form a judgment as to the competence and performance of the American Am-

bassador to the Dominican Republic at the time of the revolt.

I am not prepared on the basis of the record, as I have read it, to pass judgment on him, to either praise him or blame him, since I do not believe it is clear as to how much responsibility he had in the determination of either short-range or long-range policies, and to what extent he or his office was the principal source of information during the crisis.

The case raises a rather interesting question as to whether in any country, such as the Dominican Republic, we should be prepared to give the Ambassador more authority or responsibility, or whether he should be somewhat continually subject to central control or authority. That decision would depend on policy in the formation of which the Senate must participate, and, of course, it would depend somewhat on the personality of the men who were appointed to these particular posts.

An examination of the record of the latest Dominican crisis would not be profitable if limited only to the period of the events of the last 5 or 6 months. The choices offered were very limited. However, review and reflection on it may be profitable in the long run.

First, if we look back to the events of 1963 when the Bosch government—a constitutionally elected government—was overthrown, and examine our response to that military coup.

Second, if it leads to reexamination and reevaluation of our basic policy with reference to political, social, and economic change in Central and South American countries.

We should reexamine the policy with respect to sugar, followed by the State Department and Washington officials. In 1965 when the quota of the Dominican Republic, or what might have been the quota, was drastically reduced, countries such as South Africa were given sufficient volume of the sugar quota.

Third, if it moves us to a thorough examination of the organization and function of the Organization of American States, and specifically of the role of the United States in that organization.

The administration has been criticized for not making the Dominican action an OAS intervention at the start. This is not fair criticism. As the OAS is presently organized, we should not expect too much of it in situations of this kind. There is a question of how much we can ever expect of it unless the power and responsibility are somewhat better balanced among the nations of the OAS. The OAS operates at present somewhat along the lines of the General Assembly of the United Nations, but it has no equivalent of the Security Council. I suggest that if the OAS is to take on broader authority and be more effective—not only in military and “peacekeeping” activities but also in comprehensive economic development—a new procedure must be developed that provides some balance of authority for action and decisionmaking between the Latin American States on the one hand and the United States on the other.

And fourth, if we are going to intervene under certain circumstances on the

basis of the overriding importance of the national security of the United States—as it is clearly implied in our intervention in Cuba and this most recent intervention in the Dominican Republic and the resolution of the House of Representatives—then we must be prepared to change our economic policy and relationships significantly so as to provide greater stability and economic progress in these countries in somewhat the same way that it has been achieved in Puerto Rico.

This would not necessarily imply any limitation on the sovereignty or political independence of these countries; it does imply a repositioning of our entire policy toward them.

It is surely more in keeping with the traditional foreign policy objectives of the United States and with our obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty to conduct our policy in terms of an attack on the causes of economic, social, and political unrest, rather than, as seems to have been the case recently, to apply radical surgery when the disease risks getting out of control.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to thank the Senator from Minnesota. He has made a real contribution to the clarification of this issue. What he has had to say with regard to the merits of the case I believe are accurate and do make a contribution.

I would like to suggest that there are two main questions involved.

One is the Dominican crisis, which I discussed on September 15, and to which the Senator referred. That is one question upon which certainly people can disagree as to the meaning of the testimony.

As to the reference to classified material, the Senator is quite accurate in stating that the material revealed by other speakers, specifically the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], was before the committee in classified form. I assume it was declassified, for the benefit of the Senator from Connecticut, because I am sure he would not violate a classification which related primarily to the names of participants in the revolution.

However, the main point that I had in mind was not so much the Dominican revolution itself, but the long-term policy that this country is to follow in the future, because obviously we could not do anything about the Dominican revolution. No one on the committee had advance notice that it was going to take place, nor did we know the circumstances that existed there until long after they occurred, until we had the hearings.

But I believe it is important, and as the Senator pointed out, to ask: What will be our policy in similar situations if they arise in the future? They are almost certain to arise. Latin America is an area of change. It has been an area of change for quite awhile.

Would the Senator not agree that the resolution recently passed in the House of Representatives would tend to confirm the thesis I advanced that the United States is going to intervene even if there is no threat, or only a remote

threat of Communist infiltration or domination in these cases?

This is a contested point. What kind of policy is the United States going to follow in the future?

I believe the House action suggests the United States may in the future act contrary to the solemn obligations this country has undertaken in the past, fortified by treaties about intervention ratified by the Senate.

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly the resolution of the House of Representatives appears to reflect a policy which would be in contradiction of what we agreed to in our treaty with the Organization of American States.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The sponsor of that resolution stated on the floor of the House of Representatives that the administration had no objection to it. He did not say they approved or opposed it. I read what he said. He said in response to a direct question that the Department had no objection to it.

My point is that for the discussion to have value it is necessary to raise the questions: What is our real policy in Latin America, and is it to be changed from that which we undertook in the Rio Pact and OAS Charter? If our policy is to be changed, it seems to me it should be changed in an orderly way. We should not unilaterally undertake to change those solemn treaty obligations.

Mr. McCARTHY. I agree with the Senator.

Apparently the administration did not object to the resolution of the House of Representatives. If for no other reason, they should have respect for the Senate which has the responsibility, insofar as Congress is concerned.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Aside from what the sponsor of the resolution said, I have seen no public statement by any member of the administration that they disapproved the resolution. Maybe someone made such a statement but I have not seen one that would indicate in any public way they did disapprove.

Mr. McCARTHY. Maybe they think it will just go away. I know of no public statement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe this is an extremely important issue that has application not only in Latin America, which is close and a most significant area to us, but if there are revolutions—and there are bound to be revolutions in other parts of the world—is our policy going to be that even if there is only a threat of Communist influence we are going to undertake to intervene?

It seems to me that this implies a change in our policy. I have the feeling that there are other reasons for believing our basic policies are changing and that we tend to intervene. Take the aid programs, for example. We start out with the best of motives to help a country, and then we seem impelled by some events to intervene in a military way.

Personally, I should like to clarify the issue and have it debated so we may reach a sound judgment before this trend goes too far. That was the main reason why I raised the question. I believe this is the kind of policy that should not be

September 30, 1965

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

24711

allowed to drift along without a thorough discussion by Members of the Senate. The discussion by the Senator from Minnesota has made a great contribution to that end.

Although there have been some differing views expressed with respect to the Dominican Republic, I am pleased that much of the press has commented on these matters, particularly with respect to the long-range effect that seems involved in our projected course of action.

I plan, as soon as I can reasonably do so, to gather some of the responses from both the domestic press and from Latin American commentators on this issue, and present them for the information of the Senate, and, I hope, for the information of the administration, also.

I believe it to be extremely important that there be no doubt about what our policy is with regard to our neighbors in Latin America. I am quite sure that our neighbors in Latin America are presently somewhat confused as to what our intentions are. Does the Senator from Minnesota agree?

Mr. McCARTHY. I quite agree. As I said soon after the Senator's speech of the 15th, the important question raised by the Senator from Arkansas was whether there had been a change in our policy with respect to Latin America between what it was in 1963 and what it is today.

That is not merely a question to which we should get a response from the administration. It is a question that we ought to ask ourselves. It is a question that every Member of the Senate ought to ask. Our function in the Senate is not merely to find out what the administration policy is and then to say yes or no to it—and oftentimes too late. We have a definite responsibility to develop policy ourselves.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. SMATHERS. Does the Senator from Minnesota contend that the primary responsibility for establishing foreign policy does not lie in the hands of the President and the executive branch of the Government?

Mr. McCARTHY. No; I should say that the responsibility for foreign policy is shared primarily, according to the Constitution, between the President and the executive branch, and the Senate.

Mr. SMATHERS. Does the Senator mean to state that the Senate shares on an equal basis with the President the conduct of our foreign policy?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator did not say "conduct"; he said "policy" a minute ago.

Mr. SMATHERS. Very well; the establishment of policy.

Mr. McCARTHY. Policy, yes. I think the Senate has as much responsibility to determine general policy with reference to Latin America as does the President. The Senate would be remiss in its duty if it denied itself that prerogative. I do not believe we can measure it as equal status, but the Senate has full respon-

sibility for consideration of our foreign policy.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Under the Constitution, what do the words "advice and consent" mean?

Mr. SMATHERS. They mean that the Senate shall advise and consent with respect to treaties. I am sure the Senator from Minnesota will agree that the Constitution contains no provision that the Senate shall have equal responsibility with the President in the conduct of foreign policy. I am sure the Senator from Minnesota knows that that is the case.

Mr. McCARTHY. Of course I know it.

Mr. SMATHERS. The primary responsibility is with the President. While the Senate has every right to speak about and discuss foreign policy, nevertheless the President has the responsibility for conducting foreign policy.

For example, if a Republican President were occupying the White House and the Senate were overwhelmingly Democratic controlled, it might be that a Republican President would wish to take one course, and the Senate would have no authority to tell the Republican President—or any President, for that matter—that he did not have the final responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs. I would have to disagree with the distinguished Senator from Minnesota on that particular point.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let us assume that the Senate had rejected the test ban treaty. Would it have been in order for the President to proceed to enter into an international agreement?

Mr. SMATHERS. The test ban action was taken by a treaty. The Constitution specifically provides that treaties shall be entered into with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Mr. McCARTHY. Assume that the President, had not taken the treaty route but had merely entered into an agreement.

Mr. SMATHERS. He would have been exceeding his authority. But as Commander in Chief, as the person charged with foreign policy, he would have had the right to make the decision.

Mr. McCARTHY. Under what clause of the Constitution would that have been valid?

Mr. SMATHERS. I am sure the Senator from Minnesota would agree with me, in response to the question of the Senator from Arkansas, that it would be a mistake for the President to lock himself in on some hard and fast, set policy as to what he proposed to do in every respect, no matter what might develop throughout the country.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Florida talks about treaties. The United States signed two treaties—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair). The 15 minutes allocated to the Senator from Minnesota have expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Minnesota may proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not know that the Senate was operating under a time limitation.

Mr. McCARTHY. Time was yielded to me under a special request. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have already cited one solemn treaty which in no uncertain words committed this country not to intervene for any cause whatsoever, the only exception being that in certain areas of intervention, by something less than overt force, we should consult with the members of the OAS, which we did not do.

It strikes me that a basic problem is involved. If the Senator from Florida is saying that those treaties, two of which were negotiated and agreed to by the Executive and ratified by the Senate, have no restraining affect or influence, I could not disagree with him more thoroughly.

The concept of the President being permitted to do anything he likes in the field of foreign relations is a concept that has grown up. It is a misguided concept, dating back to certain resolutions adopted by the Senate, one relating to Formosa, in the Eisenhower administration, and one more recently in the Johnson administration, with respect to the Gulf of Tonkin. This has led some Senators to believe that there is no restraint whatever on any President; that he can do as he pleases. It is true that he has the power, but that does not mean he has the legitimate, constitutional right to use it.

It is difficult for the legislature to control the President if he wishes to exercise such power, but we have our duty. Once such power has been exercised by the President, it is our duty to call him to account. That is what I was trying to do.

The Senator from Florida has too restricted a view of the Senate's role. The Constitution provides that the Senate shall advise and consent. It is the duty of the Senate, in proper cases and under proper circumstances, to advise any Executive of our views as to any past actions or, if we like, as to possible future actions.

My main purpose in this case was to influence future actions. Surely we ought to learn from the circumstances that existed in the Dominican Republic what should be the proper action in the future, provided we are still willing to live up to the announced policies affirmed by the Senate on the two occasions I have mentioned. We should abide by those policies, certainly until they are changed by the action of a treaty and action by the Senate. Those policies ought not to be unilaterally thrown overboard.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. The majority leader announced a little while ago that the Senate would vote at 4 o'clock on the motion of the Senator from Tennessee to postpone action on the pending bill. I should like to address myself further



to the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas and the distinguished Senator from Minnesota, but I do not believe this is the appropriate time for me to do so. I shall take my seat now and restrain myself, so that the Senate may proceed with the consideration of the pending bill.

#### AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS TRADE ACT OF 1965

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9042) to provide for the implementation of the Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada, and for other purposes.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I understand that the distinguished Senator from Indiana desires to obtain the floor now to make a statement.

Mr. HARTKE. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the United States-Canada auto parts agreement should be rejected, or at least final action should be deferred until a thorough investigation and report have been made by the Tariff Commission. I say this after thorough study and out of deep conviction. The question is highly involved and is not easy to explain. But after hours of hearings in the Finance Committee, after detailed probing of the question, after a year and a half of acquaintance not only with the agreement but with the conditions which called into being, and in the light of petitions containing the signatures of more than 10,000 employees from all over the United States, I find it impossible to agree with the committee majority that H.R. 9042, providing for its implementation, should be enacted. I have said so briefly and with restraint in the separate dissenting views which appear over my signature and those of Senator RIBICOFF and Senator GORE in the committee report. I wish to state now more fully my reasons and urge their thoughtful consideration by Senators.

My reasons include these considerations:

First. The agreement legitimizes illegal action taken unilaterally by the Canadian Government in its tariff remission scheme.

Second. It is a bilateral undertaking ignoring our commitment to the most favored nation principle and to GATT, from which we must seek a waiver.

Third. It purports to be free trade, but it is not free trade. It is special legislation for the benefit of a single industry, which is itself a third party to the agreement in a highly official and highly irregular manner.

Fourth. It results in no price reductions for individual customers on either side of the border, but in a \$50 million annual tariff saving to the automakers for the construction of Canadian plants.

Fifth. It encourages the partial displacement of the independent auto parts industry in the United States, and its relocation in Canada or its only alterna-

tive, loss of business and jobs in the United States.

Sixth. It anticipates the adverse effect on U.S. jobs through its elaborate provisions for special adjustment assistance measures for displaced businesses and workers.

Seventh. It will encourage dumping by Canada on the U.S. market.

Eighth. It will have an adverse effect upon the U.S. balance of payments.

#### EFFECT OF AGREEMENT

The intent and the expected effect of the agreement is to improve the share of the Canadian auto industry in the United States-Canada joint market.

The claimed benefit for the United States is a greater "rationalization" of the industry. Ford testified before the committee, for instance, that it has been assembling 71 models in its Canadian plant. But to meet its Canadian production requirement under the agreement, it could manufacture long-production runs of standard Fords, importing completed Mercuries and Falcons and shipping half the Canadian production to the United States in return.

But the crux of the matter lies in what happens to the independent U.S. parts manufacturer.

There are two incentives for parts plants to move their operations to Canada as a result of this agreement.

First, there is the Canadian value added requirement, which disposes the Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies to secure as many parts as possible in Canada.

Second, there is the competitive advantage to parts made in Canada for unhampered import to the United States for use in manufacture of automobiles here. There is a labor cost differential which has been estimated at 50 to 70 cents an hour. It is that much cheaper in Canada.

Let me cite testimony on this point from statements appearing in the public press.

President Lynn A. Townsend, of Chrysler Corp.—

Said Business Week of January 23 following the signing of the agreement—foresees the day when some auto companies may decide to build their entire supply of certain basic components—frames, engines, transmissions, springs—in Canada.

That was before the arrangement was put into provisional operation. Now, 9 months later, we have some indication of the effects.

Kelsey Wheel Co., of Windsor, Ontario, has started its first export of Canadian-made wheels to the United States, for 1966 models. Employees who formerly made these wheels in the United States are no longer making them.

General Motors of Canada is exporting Canadian-made interior auto trim to the United States for the first time.

At least 20 new Canadian plants are in the planning stages, and as many more are expanding and adding as much as 5 million square feet of new floor space for the production of the following, as listed by the Canadian publication Financial Post, in its September 18 issue:

The projects cover a wide range of materials—various types of steel, synthetic fibers, plastics, rubber, chemicals, paints—and hundreds of auto parts ranging from screws to 250-pound metal auto frames.

The Canadian paper, which is the counterpart of our Barron's, continues to make the link with the thrust provided by this agreement entirely clear:

The extra capacity will be needed to enable the automakers to boost the Canadian value-added content of their vehicles in line with commitments already given Ottawa.

It is said that there will be more Canadian-made goods in the Canadian automobiles and less of the American-made goods.

Besides the specific increase of the Canadian auto parts factories at the expense of our own, there is the expectation that steel production will increase in Canada.

The Canadian newspaper—not our press, but theirs—in talking about this agreement and what it means to Canadians, states:

Canadian steelmakers see a potential additional market of 400,000 to 500,000 tons a year opening up as a result of the expanded auto program.

The extra steel will go into dozens of applications, including the two biggest: auto frames and heavy body stampings.

The same newspaper reports plans of the Budd Co. for a \$12 to \$14 million Canadian plant for manufacture of auto frames, which have never been made before in Canada. Facilities for heavy stampings—hoods, deck lids, roof sections, and the like—all now done in the United States, "are expected to follow later." They are expected to be made in Canada.

#### CANADIAN PRODUCTION ALREADY UP

I have no objection to the Canadians increasing their production of automobile parts and vehicles. As I have repeatedly stated, I am interested in their having progress and prosperity. However, in any agreement between two nations, there should be something for both sides. It should not be merely for one side. But this agreement is so structured that it is impossible for it to be achieved without the decrease of specific jobs in the United States. So long as the total market grows rapidly enough, it may not be a matter of absolute decrease in U.S. jobs, but rather a small growth accompanied by rapid and disproportionate Canadian growth. But if the total market shrinks, the shrinkage will be largely on the U.S. side of the border. And at best, even now, there is displacement of our workers already taking place as production and plants move to Canada.

I believe that the Senator from Ohio, who is presiding at this moment, read the telegram received today about the plant in Ohio. There is a Fisher body plant, which I visited a week ago, which employs approximately 8,000 people in Marion, Ind.

As soon as this agreement is implemented, and I now venture to be a prophet, you will see a great crystallizing of plans now largely tentative and unannounced, for the moving of parts production to Canada.